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Francis Fukuyama’s (2008:23(3):1–17) 
article on post-conflict and development 
challenges facing Solomon Islands is 
pessimistic about the available options 
and future prospects for state building. 
This pessimism leads him to suggest, 
principally, a long-term, élite-led nation-
building effort and shared sovereignty with 
the international community. Fukuyama 
invites others to contribute alternative ways 
of thinking about the policy suggestions he 
raises. This article takes up Fukuyama’s 
invitation by foregrounding discussion of 
wantokism—an influential kinship-derived 
system of obligation and support operating 
throughout Solomon Islands—which 
Fukuyama also addresses in his article.
In the first part of this article, I argue 
that Fukuyama misunderstands wantokism 
by viewing it narrowly and negatively. His 
account of segmentary societies misses 
the importance of crosscutting ties linking 
individual selves and groups from the 
interpersonal to national and international 
levels in Solomon Islands and the wider 
region. Fukuyama also views wantokism 
through a more or less explicit liberal 
developmentalist frame, which places all 
cultures and societies on a spectrum moving 
towards an ideal represented by the West. 
This contributes to his misrecognition of 
wantokism, and leads him to overvalue 
Western liberal democracy. In addition, 
Fukuyama’s developmentalism requires 
him to be an advocate of institutions that 
have their origins in war and colonial 
violence and do not resonate culturally in 
Solomon Islands.
The second part of this article dem-
onstrates that alternatives to Fukuyama’s 
suggestions become available through a 
more nuanced understanding of Melanesian 
social organisation and a less overtly devel-
opmentalist frame. In particular, it advances 
the innovative possibility of drawing on 
wantokism as a culturally recognised and 
valuable resource for addressing the current 
challenges faced by Solomon Islands. To do 
so, I illustrate the potential advantages of 
drawing on wantokism in relation to some 
of the key challenges Fukuyama raises. 
I demonstrate that wantokism can be mo-
bilised to facilitate emergent (rather than 
arbitrary or imposed) national identity 
and nation building. Second, and by way 
of responding to likely objections, I show 
that wantokism does not only or necessarily 
drive corruption. Rather, the connections 
facilitated by wantokism can be linked with 
checks and balances in Melanesian social 
organisation that can in turn be used to 
work against corruption. Finally, I briefly 
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consider a particular challenge raised by 
Fukuyama—the administration of the 
Rural Constituency Development Fund 
(RCDF)—to show that drawing on wantokism 
and traditional governance at the local level 
could be a way of ensuring accountable 
administration of such funds and boosting 
the development of community-driven 
mechanisms to hold members of parliament 
and others to account.
This article is critical of Fukuyama’s 
understanding of wantokism and his policy 
suggestions. At the same time, it is im-
portant to acknowledge that his frank 
and open identification and discussion of 
important issues have no doubt reached 
a wide audience. For that we should be 
appreciative. This article aims to expand 
on Fukuyama, but it cannot make claim to 
be fully comprehensive—either in terms of 
a critical response to Fukuyama’s article 
or in analysing the issues facing Solomon 
Islands. It is also the case that combining 
strong criticism and innovative proposals 
in one article risks shortfalls. These risks are 
perhaps magnified when writing about oth-
ers’ social and political systems. Fukuyama 
and I, despite the strong differences I 
identify here, are wantoks of a type—we 
share the language of the academy and there 
are inevitable limitations to what we can say 
about Solomon Islands. For now, I can live 
with the fact that I am writing about rather 
than with Solomon Islanders. I hope that 
others, however, and particularly Solomon 
Islanders, will join the discussion to expand 
on the analysis and debate introduced in 
Fukuyama’s article and this response.
Framing wantokism and Solomon 
Islanders
Fukuyama’s rendering of wantokism 
structures his article. We can gain an 
understanding of his treatment of this 
kinship-derived social institution in the 
opening paragraph. The first sentence tells 
us that ‘[v]irtually all developed-country 
visitors to Melanesia have to confront the 
wantok system, which to many seems like 
a unique and exotic cultural practice, and a 
huge obstacle to the country’s modernisation’ 
(Fukuyama 2008:1). Fukuyama immediately 
puts us on an antagonistic footing. We 
industrial-country folk, burdened as we 
are with carriage of development and 
progress, are clearly facing a problem. We 
are not encountering or experiencing or 
coming to know the wantok system, and we 
are certainly not dealing with something 
benign. Rather, wantokism is affronting, and 
must be confronted.
Here Fukuyama reproduces the populist 
understandings and prejudices of many 
expatriates and visitors by framing a central 
local social institution as a ‘problem’. We 
might forgive him this opening to the 
extent that his view is shared by others, 
and because it also points to real difficulties 
in contemporary governance. We then 
quickly learn, however, that wantokism is 
to be dealt with summarily rather than in 
a considered way: ‘It is indeed an obstacle, 
but it is hardly unique or exotic in human 
history’ (Fukuyama 2008:1). The locals 
cannot put a foot right: wantokism is trouble, 
and any claim to uniqueness dissipates 
under the scientific and universalising 
gaze of the anthropologist.1 Beyond the 
disrespectful posture towards a key local 
institution, Fukuyama’s summary treatment 
of wantokism places severe constraints on 
his analysis. Wantokism is not ‘simply the 
local version of what anthropologists call 
a segmentary lineage’ (Fukuyama 2008:1), 
and contrary to what Fukuyama suggests, 
wantokism is a modern rather than tribal or 
traditional institution. I will elaborate these 
points shortly.
The second important theme introduced 
in Fukuyama’s opening paragraph is a 
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familiar (albeit often invisible for being too 
familiar) developmentalist conceptualisa-
tion of the world’s peoples. In this under-
standing, countries become positioned in 
a schema with Western countries serving 
as representatives of the most advanced 
social, political and economic state—a 
position to which other countries should 
aspire. Fukuyama (2008:1) writes that ‘[s]
egmentary societies…were superceded at a 
fairly early point by more modern forms of 
political organisation not based on kinship’. 
In this schema, humanity is placed on a 
linear time scale wherein Melanesian-style 
societies are to be naturally surpassed and 
in which modernity and kinship-based 
systems are antithetical. We might agree 
with Fukuyama (2008:1) that kin-based 
societies in Europe ‘could not meet the 
challenges of large-scale social integration in 
a region characterised by persistent warfare 
and expanding trade’. It is noteworthy, 
however, that, again, kin-based societies 
fare badly—it is they who do not meet a 
challenge while phenomena of ‘persistent 
warfare and expanding trade’ are treated 
neutrally. The developmentalist schema 
prevails; it seems that we cannot identify 
persistent warfare as a problem if it forms 
an important—albeit regrettable—part of 
the European progress narrative.
Much of Fukuyama’s article lends itself 
to this type of critical reading, but there is 
no need to labour the point. The forgoing 
analysis of Fukuyama’s opening paragraph 
suffices to tell us that Fukuyama approaches 
wantokism as a problem, and that the fram-
ing of the problem is reinforced by placing 
Solomon Islands and its people within 
a developmentalist schema that values 
the West positively while devaluing local 
institutions. Within this frame there is no 
need to ask questions about why the system 
Solomon Islanders inherited at the time of 
independence in 1978 has not managed 
to facilitate or support good relationships 
among people. Certainly, there is no option 
to ask if something might be amiss with 
introduced systems or to consider the 
complex fusion and interaction of local and 
exogenous governance. Rather, it is clear 
that there is something wrong with Solomon 
Islanders and their cultural institutions. 
Moving beyond this narrow and negative 
view requires showing how Fukuyama 
misunderstands wantokism.
Textbook segmentary society 
versus lived wantokism
Fukuyama builds his analysis of wantokism 
through a rudimentary understanding 
of historical anthropology that has all 
segmentary societies sharing the same 
characteristics. According to Fukuyama 
(2008:2), such societies are organised 
through kinship, and particularly through 
‘exclusive, non-overlapping descent groups’. 
This interpretation allows an analysis that 
is both parsimonious and familiar for many 
readers because it aligns with dominant 
European understandings of selfhood and 
social and political life. If small-scale groups 
are exclusive and non-overlapping, they 
can be readily mapped onto the Western 
understanding of individuals as separate 
centres of cognitive and emotional action 
(Geertz 1979:229). Conceiving of kinship 
groups as exclusive and self-sufficient 
allows analysts to smuggle in and reproduce 
a version of the Hobbessian problem, where 
others are always a threat and/or potential 
enemy.
The Hobessian framework, though, 
does not travel well. Along with many 
other Pacific islanders, Melanesian people 
tend to operate with a version of selfhood 
much less bounded and separate than that 
prevalent among Westerners. Individuals 
tend to be susceptible to—and bound 
with—each other. White and Watson-Gegeo 
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(1990:8) note that ‘concepts of person in 
Pacific cultures tend to be highly relational, 
with notions of relatedness elaborated 
in a great variety of ways in social life’. 
Moreover, Melanesian understandings of 
group identity and relations are consistent 
with understandings of personal identity 
(Harrison 2007:67).
The much-noted diversity of Melanesian 
cultures, then, arises out of relatedness 
rather than—as is commonly thought—the 
assumed isolation of tribal groups from each 
other and the wider world. Longstanding 
contact among peoples, including through 
exchange and trade in ideas and cultural 
forms, allowed groups to articulate their 
differences and maintain connections such 
that individuals and groups ‘could have 
rights in, and affiliations to, several cultural 
identities at once’ (Harrison 2007:70). Within 
this system, both cultural difference and 
cultural sameness deserve to be ‘conceived 
in an imagery of transactional networks and 
lines of transmission rather than of discrete 
and bounded entities’ (Harrison 2007:70–1). 
Melanesian groups have developed a 
‘sharedness’ and sameness among themselves, 
even though it is developed through 
processes of group differentiation.
This is not to say that Melanesian social 
relations were or are inherently peaceful. 
The pre-colonial (or pre-missionary) era 
was not a time of peace. As Harrison’s 
(2007) analysis shows, however, pre-colonial 
feuding and warfare were not associated 
with differences in tribal identity or culture 
per se. Rather, conflict arose out of a fear 
of sameness, manifesting, for instance, in 
violent conflict over the appropriation of 
cultural symbols. And even amid violence, 
foreignness and relationality were valued. 
In pre-colonial times, enemies were often 
dehumanised and treated badly, but it was 
also the case that ‘many war captives were 
adopted into their host societies and treated 
as kin’ (McDougall and Kere forthcoming).
It is important not to overstate the 
difference between Western (individualist) 
and Melanesian (relational) selfhood. 
Solomon Islanders cannot be described 
simply as ‘collectivist’2 and it is probably 
the case that tension between relationality 
and individuality is central to the lived 
experience of most people (Harrison 
2007:66). Nonetheless, it is also the case 
that Melanesian understandings of personal 
and group identity foreground linkages 
and relationships (Harrison 2007:67). These 
understandings of individual and group 
identities have come under pressure due 
to the introduction of Western models of 
personhood and political organisation 
through colonialism, development and glo-
balisation,3 but they are far from displaced 
or eradicated.
Recent work by Michael Scott (2000) 
and Debra McDougall (2000, 2005) shows 
that Solomon Islanders maintain in their 
social relations a subtle balance between 
autochthony articulated through lineage 
groups and complex entwinement with 
others outside these groups for the purposes 
of marriage, trade and so forth. Maintaining 
this balance can include people obfuscating, 
downplaying or remaining silent about their 
lineages and hence claims to autochthony 
(Scott 2000). It can also include public rheto-
ric overtly denying the importance of social 
boundaries (McDougall 2005:94).
More fundamental ly,  Scott  and 
McDougall document a cosmological 
imperative to enter into a positive relation-
ship with the foreign or other. Within 
Solomon Islands social organisation, then, 
there is no ontological imperative to keep 
others out or to see them as a threat or 
enemy. To the contrary, much of the his-
tory of interaction across difference in the 
areas now known as Solomon Islands is 
characterised by establishing and transact-
ing exchanges across difference (Harrison 
2007:75). The separateness or boundedness 
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that Fukuyama extrapolates from his 
understanding of descent group simply 
does not apply in Solomon Islands.
The conflict events of the recent past can-
not be read directly off the forgoing broad 
account of social order and earlier conflict, 
but key characteristics of the 1998–2003 
conflict—particularly the relatively low 
levels of battle deaths and extent of civilian 
displacement—are closely related to social 
organisation. Brutal atrocities were commit-
ted, but people also escaped or mitigated 
violence through crosscutting ties among 
militants and civilians. People and property 
were regularly protected through crosscut-
ting kinship ties formed through networks 
of intermarriage or simply through long-
standing associations and friendships across 
difference. It is also crucial to point out that 
relationships formed through the churches 
(entirely overlooked in Fukuyama’s article) 
were consistently used to work for peace. 
My Solomon Islands’ contacts place great 
value on these social bonds. While they 
are deeply saddened and troubled by the 
1998–2003 conflict, they are also keenly 
aware of the important role relationships 
across difference and traditional and church 
institutions played in mitigating so-called 
‘ethnic’ conflict. In the post-conflict period, 
these same institutions were used to initiate 
reconciliation processes independent of 
state or other outside support.
The centrality of relationality in 
Melanesian social worlds deeply undercuts 
Fukuyama’s assertion about the exclusivity 
and separateness of descent groups to the 
point that his understanding of wantokism 
cannot hold. Most groups have likely 
never conceived themselves as exclusive. 
Moreover, Solomon Islanders tend to be far 
more multicultural and cosmopolitan—and 
put far greater value on difference and on 
working together across difference—than 
is suggested by Fukuyama’s reading of 
wantokism. It is true that anthropologists 
did experiment with the segmentary model 
drawn from African contexts, but following 
an article by Barnes (1962) there has been 
general agreement that the fluidity of 
Melanesian cultures rules out any direct 
transfer (Sillitoe 1998:141). For the same 
reason, it is not possible, contra Fukuyama’s 
suggestions throughout his article, to gain 
insight into Solomon Islands’ situation by 
drawing on what has occurred in African 
settings (Fraenkel 2004).
Melanesian social order is perhaps 
not of a type readily recognisable or easily 
assimilated to mainstream Western social 
science underpinned by rational actor as-
sumptions or driven by simple comparative 
analysis. As Solomon Islanders and devel-
opment and peacebuilding professionals 
grapple with contemporary challenges, 
however, it is incumbent on us to improve 
our understanding of wantokism and related 
social institutions. 
The lived experience and social interac-
tions facilitated by wantokism in Solomon 
Islands suggest, contra Fukuyama, an 
institution that is in fact quite expansive. 
Indeed, wantokism is not closely tied to a 
descent group. Nor is it—as Fukuyama 
implies—an atavistic institution. Rather, we 
can better define wantokism as a system of 
generalised obligations and supports that 
permeates contemporary Melanesian social 
and political life. The system in Solomon 
Islands is closely related to kinship relation-
ships, but it is a modern phenomenon that 
emerged in the colonial era as people were 
drawn into plantation and administration 
work. Wantokism (wantok = literally ‘one 
talk’) arose as different tribes with shared 
language found commonality and provided 
support to each other in new settings, at 
least in part in juxtaposition to colonial 
overseers. This experience was repeated 
among shared language groups through the 
development of Solomon Islands pijin.
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Wantokism can refer to those who share 
kinship ties but also includes, on larger 
scales, those who share the same language, 
are from the same area, from the same island 
and the same region of the world. So, in a 
village context, one’s wantoks are direct kin, 
but as one moves further away from local 
contexts one’s pool of wantoks expands. 
In the capital, Honiara, one’s wantoks can 
include those from one’s home village or 
the surrounding tribal grouping/s. In the 
broader Pacific and in international settings, 
all Melanesians—particularly those from 
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Papua New 
Guinea and Fiji—become one’s wantoks. 
In other words, pre-colonial Melanesian 
understandings of relationality have shifted 
with social and political change.
Wantokism does not imply the separa-
tion among groups that Fukuyama claims. 
His application of the idea of the exclusive 
and separate descent to describe wantokism 
in Solomon Islands is overwhelmed by 
the great variety of crosscutting ties that 
reflects the interdependence of individual 
selves and groups from the interpersonal 
to international level. This has important 
implications for political organisation, 
including possibilities for state building. 
Wantokism and political organisation 
We can agree with Fukuyama (2008:2) 
that kin-based societies often ‘tend to be 
egalitarian and non-hierarchical’. At face 
value, many might find this appealing; but 
in Fukuyama’s (2008:2) misunderstanding 
of wantoks as exclusive and underdeveloped, 
they can come together only through 
‘temporary alliances of lineages, clans, or 
tribes for purposes of defence or aggression’; 
they cannot underpin ‘collective action 
at any large scale’ (p.10). The forgoing 
discussion shows, however, that contact 
among groups was and is continuing rather 
than sporadic, and that there is a larger 
form of organisation at play in Solomon 
Islands. This form of organisation, which we 
might loosely term networked rather than 
hierarchical, might not readily lend itself to 
the type of collective action that Fukuyama 
views as necessary for the dominant version 
of a modern nation-state, but it is clearly 
some form of collective action—it must be for 
Fukuyama (and others) to be able to write 
about it. The issue at play here, then, relates 
to different forms of organisation, the value 
we attach to them and the accompanying 
possibilities for contemporary nation and 
state building.
For Fukuyama (2008:2), larger-scale 
organisation is valued only in a particular 
form: ‘The fact that there is no sovereign 
enforcer of rules means that justice has to 
be compensatory and negotiated on a case-
by-case basis by kin groups.’ Sovereignty 
is central. In devaluing dispersed and 
more informal forms of governance, 
Fukuyama follows a familiar European 
pattern of identifying indigenous peoples 
as lacking in the institutions necessary for 
civilised life, while identifying Western 
systems—systems with very hierarchical 
and institutionalised command–obedience 
power relations—as the only valid forms of 
political organisation.
We need not, though, automatically 
interpret the absence of centralised gover-
nance as a lack. In a famous collection of es-
says, Pierre Clastres (2007) suggests that an 
absence of hierarchical command–obedience 
relations is not a shortfall or an accident. 
Rather, Clastres (2007:44, 45) argued that 
the South American Indian societies he 
studied ‘had a very early premonition that 
power’s transcendence conceals a mortal 
risk for the group’ and that as a result they 
created a ‘means for neutralizing the 
virulence of political authority’. The values 
associated with such practices (participatory 
democratic decision making and checking 
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the centralisation of power, for instance) 
are not dissimilar to those advanced in 
Western societies—indeed, to those values 
that inform liberal democracy. Westerners, 
however, often misrecognise other societies 
by viewing them as underdeveloped within 
a developmentalist schema and by placing 
undue emphasis on the formal institutions 
of governance. As Bozeman (1960:7) notes, 
European ‘overemphasis on the political 
and constitutional aspects of their social 
development have disregarded many 
sources of cultural strength’.
In this light, we can reassess Fukuyama’s 
(2008:2) claim that kinship-based societies 
have ‘certain critical weaknesses’—most 
notably an ‘inability to achieve collective 
action at a large scale for extended periods 
of time’. In the narrow confines of a 
Hobbessian world, Melanesian forms of 
political organisation indeed appear weak to 
the extent that they can be overwhelmed—
although not displaced—by larger and more 
hierarchically structured political forms. 
From a broader perspective, however, 
in which we explore and deliberate the 
possibilities of different forms of political 
organisation, we might find more possibili-
ties in wantokism.
To be open to such possibilities, it is 
crucial that we do not draw simple distinc-
tions between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
institutions. Indigenous and introduced 
governance are thoroughly entwined in 
Solomon Islands. While some make much of 
descriptions of the introduced Westminster 
system as an ill-fitting garment, this should 
be tempered by an understanding that 
there has also been a great deal of blending 
of the two systems. The problems of poor 
governance that Fukuyama and others tend 
to lay at the door of wantokism emerge only 
to the extent to which individuals or groups 
are inserted at key points within social and 
political systems that are organised on a 
hierarchical basis—an apical basis in the 
case of the introduced governance system in 
Solomon Islands. In other words, corruption 
is facilitated through ‘modern’ as much as 
‘traditional’ systems, and the real challenge 
is how to bring appropriate resources to 
bear for effective governance in this hybrid 
scheme. 
Dilemmas of post-conflict state 
building
Fukuyama fears that negative rather than 
positive forces might displace wantokism 
as part of the development process. He can 
anticipate ‘new and highly dysfunctional 
forms of social organisation like urban gangs 
and warlord armies’ (although this seems an 
overly pessimistic outlook, unjustifiably 
drawn, again, from other contexts) and 
struggles to see how modern institutions 
can displace wantokism (Fukuyama 2008:3). 
This apparently leads him to accept that 
wantokism must be supplemented rather than 
replaced by modern institutions (Fukuyama 
2008:4–5), but because he views wantokism as 
able to be an effective form of social capital 
only at the local level, this leaves the serious 
business of state to Western institutions. 
Here Fukuyama (2008:5–6) again runs 
into problems because ideas to reform the 
State—such as legislating to encourage 
party loyalty by politicians and swamping 
the bureaucracy with modernised cohorts of 
public servants—do not seem to offer much 
hope to him. In these circumstances, he is ‘at 
a loss to understand how the country will 
ever overcome the divisions that led to the 
1999–2003 violence’ (Fukuyama 2008:9).
This apparent lack of options—the most 
explicit dilemma Fukuyama (2008:9–10) 
faces in his analysis and one perhaps shared 
by senior figures in the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)—leads 
him to argue that a political élite needs to 
develop a sense of national identity to 
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overcome wantokism. Because this is a 
long-term venture, however, which is yet to 
begin, Fukuyama’s second key suggestion 
is shared sovereignty with the international 
community.
To better consider these suggestions, it is 
useful to identify a second and more implicit 
dilemma Fukuyama points to—this time 
linked to questions of developmentalism, 
violence and liberalism. Fukuyama (2008:4) 
reminds us that ‘[p]eople in the developed 
West conveniently forget the degree to 
which their own institutions were shaped 
and made possible by violence and conflict 
in earlier historical periods’. This violence 
includes ‘coercion and deceit against in-
digenous holders of customary land rights’ 
(p.4). Fukuyama seems somewhat caught 
here. He appears to be suggesting that such 
violence and deceit are not defensible in 
the current time, but he is clearly a strong 
advocate of the institutions that result 
from such violence. At times, he does not 
shrink away from the violent processes 
that have delivered these institutions to us. 
He (2008:3) tells us that ‘the driving force 
behind Europe’s transition to ever-larger 
political structures was the need to organise 
for war’. It seems that for Fukuyama war 
is normalised or valued positively within a 
developmentalist schema as a driving force 
in generating our current forms of political 
organisation.
The recognition of the role of violence 
in the generation of modern institutions 
does not temper Fukuyama’s enthusiasm 
for imposed national identity develop-
ment (a process that is often élite-driven, 
arbitrary [p.25] and very violent) and 
sovereignty—a key institutional vehicle for 
bringing about violence and coercion on a 
grand scale in recent centuries. Here we 
have to face difficult questions about the 
export of liberalism through international 
interventions. It is impossible to say simply 
that modern liberalism, once established, is 
a benign force. The mobilisation of violent 
force in the name of the democratic peace 
in the past decade or so—particularly with 
respect to Iraq—has demonstrated too 
strongly the perversity of this contradiction. 
More fundamentally, and as Barry Hindess 
(2001) shows, liberal views of freedom are 
predicated on developmental understand-
ings in which individuals and populations 
are often judged as not (or not yet) ready or 
suitable for freedom. The upshot is that ‘[l]
iberty and domination are joined in liberal 
thought like two sides of a single coin: the 
value of one may appear on the face, but the 
figure of the other is firmly stamped on the 
reverse’ (Hindess 2001:94).
These are vexing questions for policy-
makers. How illiberal can liberal interven-
tions become before they lose the claims 
to legitimacy (including with their own 
populations) on which they rely in order to 
intervene? Of course, we should not expect 
that Fukuyama can solve this dilemma 
alone. What is particularly interesting about 
Fukuyama’s sidestepping of these issues, 
however, is the limitation it reveals—through 
his standing as someone of exemplary 
liberal developmentalist credentials and 
commitments—in the broader mainstream 
and liberal approach to post-conflict state 
building. From within this frame, it is un-
surprising that Fukuyama proposes shared 
sovereignty. It is also the case, however, that 
this proposal is strikingly predictable and 
unimaginative—and is precisely a way of 
not facing the challenges we currently face. 
The idea of shared sovereignty is a way of 
not thinking about engagement with another 
society. Indeed, it is a way of throwing our 
hands in the air and giving up on state 
building.
Rather than embracing this non-solution, 
it is important that we respond to the current 
situation in Solomon Islands with innovation 
through engagement. In this spirit, I want to 
reach beyond Fukuyama’s dominant frame 
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of liberal developmentalism to expand the 
possible options under consideration. To 
do so I propose thinking of wantokism as a 
potential resource rather than an obstacle or 
limited form of social support.
Wantokism as a resource
To begin to think of the possibilities of 
wantokism, it is necessary to extend our 
thinking about wantokism beyond the level 
of loyalties and support. While these are 
the most concrete behavioural expressions 
of wantokism, it is connections—the key 
characteristic of networks—that enable 
these behaviours. It is through connections 
that wantokism provides social support 
and establishes group identities. There 
is, however, no reason why the quality of 
connecting that is offered by the wantok 
system might not be turned—given sufficient 
support in response to contemporary 
circumstances and needs—to other tasks. 
As already noted, wantokism has already 
proven malleable by altering its scale of 
application across tribal, national and—to 
a certain extent—international levels.
One of the areas in which wantokism 
might serve as a resource is precisely in 
one of Fukuyama’s identified deficit areas: 
national identity. Wantokism is recognised 
nationally as a valuable institution for sus-
taining connections for a range of purposes. 
Indeed, it might be the only meaningful 
cultural tie. Furthermore, several decades 
of marriage across tribal and island groups 
in modern Solomon Islands has generated 
a dense countrywide web of relationships. 
The idea of drawing on such a web of 
relationships is likely to have widespread 
appeal and relevance, and would mobilise 
large numbers of individuals. The informal 
networked style of organisation sug-
gested by wantokism, circulating through 
the cultural imaginary, is precisely the type 
of bonding agent required for developing 
a national identity and driving nation 
building.
A second way in which wantokism could 
be a valuable resource is as an institution for 
facilitating good governance. Critics will, of 
course, immediately point out that loyalty 
and support behaviours, particularly among 
the political class, facilitate corruption and 
have no place in contemporary governance. 
The opportunity to draw on wantokism 
to facilitate or cover for one’s corrupt 
practices is, however, facilitated through 
the institutions of government. An export 
licence can be signed for cash, for instance, 
only by an official or minister occupying a 
senior post within a hierarchical system. It 
is somewhat disingenuous, then, to lay the 
problem of corruption wholly at the door of 
wantokism. Rather, corruption and problems 
of governance arise within a modern hybrid 
system. To single out wantokism for negative 
treatment and to attempt to overcome it with 
modern liberal institutions and practices is 
not viable and unhelpful. Of course, the 
opportunities for corruption presented by 
formal institutions and the hierarchical 
organisation of governance also cannot be 
practically removed. There is a need, then, 
to explore how wantokism might be turned 
into a resource. 
Fortunately, loyalty and support be-
haviours do not totalise the characteristics 
of wantok networks. Two of the key char-
acteristics of networks such as the wantok 
system—closely associated with the way 
they facilitate connection and relationality—
are their openness and anti-hierarchical 
tendencies. By facilitating interaction, 
exchange and the flow of information and 
knowledge, networks generate checks and 
balances. By way of illustration, Melanesian 
‘big-men’—innovative and charismatic 
leaders (usually men; only sometimes 
women) who translate modernisation and 
capitalism to villagers (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 
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1997:107)—operate within a social system, 
which means that they rely on others more 
than is usually assumed and are unable 
to extract as much personal gain as is 
sometimes expected. These individuals 
attain influence by helping others achieve 
their goals, but in the process their efforts to 
extract advantage for themselves are often 
frustrated by ‘leveling mechanisms such as 
accusations of sorcery’ (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 
1997:108). The big-man’s abilities and 
capacities can be realised only in a social 
network—and this same network also 
polices behaviour.
So while it might not be wholly possible 
(or even desirable) to separate the connec-
tions offered through wantokism from expec-
tations of loyalty and support behaviour, 
wantokism can generate checks and balances 
on undue concentrations of resources and 
power. Some Solomon Islanders tell me that 
the inclusion of wantoks from different ethnic 
groupings within a work or project team 
provides a useful counter to corruption. In 
other words, wantoks might keep each other 
in check rather than covering for each other 
when wantokism is mobilised for a common 
goal. This signals that wantokism can be a 
useful way of promoting good governance, 
particularly in pursuit of an important 
common goal such as nation building. In 
other words, wantokism might be mobilised 
against corrupt practices by opening up to 
it, rather than attempting to close it down. 
Where a closed wantok network can provide 
a way of hiding one’s bad practices, a more 
open network—such as that which could 
be promoted actively through wantok 
nationalism—could provide mechanisms 
for transparency and accountability.
Here it is important to note that Solomon 
Islanders are not blind to the problems of 
corruption and poor governance. Many 
are deeply frustrated about these issues 
and are willing to do something about 
it if—and perhaps in many cases only 
if—they have a culturally appropriate and 
sanctioned way of doing so. Facilitating a 
wantok nationalism—building on a shared 
understanding of a need for improved 
governance (a ‘wantoks against corruption’ 
campaign, for example)—might just be an 
effective jujitsu move on contemporary 
corruption in Solomon Islands. Beyond 
nation building, then, there are possibilities 
for reversing current prejudices about 
wantokism to deploy it for contemporary 
good governance.
A final and concrete way of illustrating 
the possibilities for wantokism as a resource 
for good governance in Solomon Islands 
relates to the challenges around the RCDF 
discussed by Fukuyama. Through this 
mechanism, members of parliament dis-
tribute funds directly to their constituents. 
To deal with the problems of transparency 
and accountability around these funds, 
Fukuyama turns directly to the leverage 
that the donor community might exert. 
He (2008:7) asks, ‘[S]ince so much of the 
demand for RCD funds appears to be driven 
by constituents’ need for school fees, might 
it not be possible for the donors collectively 
to suggest a simultaneous elimination of 
school fees and reduction or elimination of 
RCD funds, using the latter to pay for the 
former?’ 
Such a solution has certain obvious 
merits for education, and there is much to 
be said for better government provision 
of basic services to rural Solomon Islands 
populations. This is, however, also a blunt 
and centralist instrument that bypasses a 
rich opportunity for local political participa-
tion and empowerment that would have 
spin-off benefits for building grassroots-
driven political accountability. An alterna-
tive suggestion, then, would be—as part of 
a national wantokism political participation 
and decentralisation initiative—to in-
volve and facilitate local constituents to 
develop and propose a transparent and 
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community-accountable decision-making 
process for the distribution of the RCDF. 
Non-governmental organisations (such 
as the Solomon Islands Development 
Trust, among others) have the expertise to 
pilot such a process. This approach would 
empower village-level communities (which 
are widely acknowledged to be the heart of 
Solomon Islands) and boost the develop-
ment of community-driven mechanisms to 
hold members of parliament and others to 
account. Such an initiative would need to 
be pursued alongside improved provision 
of basic services such as education, but 
facilitating local participation through wan-
tokism would provide a way of recognising, 
supporting and building on acknowledged 
local-level community strengths in Solomon 
Islands.
The idea of drawing on wantokism for 
nation building and good governance is 
no doubt provocative and likely to attract 
objections. Some will say that wantokism will 
simply be hijacked, leading to yet poorer 
governance. This neglects, however, the 
fact that wantokism is already mobilised for 
negative ends. The challenge for generating 
good governance lies in finding a way of 
getting among relations between people 
and groups to facilitate behaviour. External 
mechanisms and values cannot do this, 
but wantokism might be able to. It is true, 
of course, that wantokism cannot guarantee 
better governance, but it does offer a vehicle 
for mobilising it.
Some urban-dwelling Solomon Islanders 
in paid employment will object to the idea of 
drawing on wantokism because they can find 
themselves harassed by wantoks constantly 
demanding bagraes (a bag/s of rice), money 
or other favours. It is understandable that 
people are frustrated about this type of 
imposition. Others, however, will point out 
that such behaviour is a manipulation of 
wantokism (and a corruption and breakdown 
of it) for individualistic purposes. It is also 
the case that the provision of cash and 
cash-goods is usually strongly reciprocated 
when urban dwellers visit or return to rural 
areas.
Other potential Solomon Islander 
objectors might include some members 
of the national élite—especially those 
educated overseas in schools of business 
and economics—who assert Western-style 
possessive individualism to differentiate 
themselves from the grassroots and to 
generate personal cultural capital in a 
modernising world (Martin 2007). As with 
complaints from those pressured by their 
wantoks, however, these tend to be instances 
of negativism rather than a wholesale or 
thoroughgoing rejection of wantokism.
It is important to note that to draw 
on wantokism does not imply a throwback 
to tribalism, a hands-off approach to the 
challenges of governance or acceptance 
of inappropriate behaviour defended or 
facilitated through wantokism. The wantok 
system is already a hybrid. It has been 
continually reworked in changing circum-
stances such that the ‘traditional’ and the 
‘modern’ are thoroughly blended. There 
is no requirement, then, for those outsid-
ers working with Solomon Islanders to 
accept the ‘traditional’ straightforwardly 
in the name of cultural appropriateness. 
This tendency—sometimes exhibited by 
progressive white folk as penance for the 
colonial sins of their forebears—can create a 
no-go zone that forecloses on exchange and 
dialogue. A more respectful process is likely 
to include careful and close engagement 
across cultural difference to explore implica-
tions for contemporary governance (Brigg 
and Muller 2009). We need to challenge 
each other and our behaviour carefully and 
respectfully. This should extend to challeng-
ing corrupt and otherwise inappropriate 
behaviour facilitated through wantokism. 
(This is necessarily a two-way process. 
Solomon Islanders quietly point out that the 
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spouses, friends and contacts of expatriate 
advisors regularly take up new posts in 
Solomon Islands aid and development 
efforts. The double standard is obvious: 
when Westerners engage in such practices it 
is ‘networking’, yet when Solomon Islanders 
behave similarly it is ‘corruption’.)
While current policy prescriptions 
for good governance tend to attempt 
to reproduce Western systems and the 
accompanying values, and to suppress 
or eradicate wantokism, I have suggested 
that consideration be given to reversing 
this pattern to seek out possibilities drawn 
from local and indigenous cultural forms 
and social organisation. Part of this reversal 
requires us to begin to think of possibilities 
arising from networks for emergent types of 
checks and balances rather than mechanical 
forms that operate through hierarchy and 
administration. Wantokism can be turned to 
positive ends. It cannot guarantee particular 
outcomes and working with it requires im-
agination and a commitment to challenge—
at least to some extent—the dominant 
assumptions of liberal developmentalism. 
Doing so, however, opens options for draw-
ing on powerful local cultural resources to 
help address the challenges currently faced 
by Solomon Islands.
Conclusions
There is little doubt that Fukuyama’s 
article has brought issues of state building 
in Solomon Islands to a broad audience. 
The foundation for his article is, however, 
an inadequate understanding of Solomon 
Islands’ wantokism. Fukuyama views 
wantokism  as separating rather than 
connecting groups, and he does so through 
a developmentalist frame that devalues non-
Western cultures. This leads him to miss the 
value of wantokism as a key Solomon Islands 
institution.
In response to Fukuyama, this article 
argues that we should expand our purview 
beyond conventional liberal developmental-
ism to draw on wantokism as a valuable 
resource. In particular, I have shown that 
wantokism can facilitate nation building 
and the development of national identity, 
and that the checks and balances internal to 
kinship-derived Melanesian social organisa-
tion can be mobilised against corruption and 
for good governance. These suggestions 
have the benefit of working with an en-
trenched and valued social institution that 
builds and sustains relationships among 
individuals and groups.
Drawing on wantokism in the present 
does not involve a return to a purer cultural 
past or a radical departure from the broadly 
liberal democratic governance system 
in place in Solomon Islands. Introduced 
or ‘Western’ and local or ‘traditional’ 
governance systems are already fused and 
entwined to the point where it is impossible 
and naïve to talk about separation. In these 
circumstances, wantokism can be mobilised 
to challenge and limit corruption and 
poor governance. Solomon Islanders are 
frustrated about poor governance, but the 
pervasiveness of liberal developmentalism 
has tended to mean that those working 
against corruption have been called to 
work against their own forms of social 
organisation or to relegate them to a quaint 
but outmoded form of social support. There 
are other possibilities. Wantokism offers a 
culturally recognised and valuable medium 
for dealing with the challenges of state and 
nation building currently faced by Solomon 
Islands. 
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Notes
1 The anthropologist is no less a figure 
than the ‘great British anthropologist E.E. 
Evans-Pritchard’ (Fukuyama 2008:1). The 
unevenness of this formulation cannot escape 
mention: the scholarship of a single white 
man is celebrated alongside the dismissal 
of an important social institution for several 
hundred thousand people—several million 
when we take wantokism as a social feature 
of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu and Fiji.
2 For shortfalls of the individualism–collectivism 
distinction, see Brigg (2008:29–30).
3 See Harrison (2007:77–80) and the special 
issue of Anthropological Forum introduced by 
Sykes (2007).
References
Barnes, J.A., 1962. ‘African models in the 
New Guinea highlands’, Man, 62:5–9.
Bozeman, A.B., 1960. Politics and Culture 
in International History, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Brigg, M., 2008. The New Politics of Conflict 
Resolution: responding to difference, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Brigg, M. and Muller, K., 2009. 
‘Conceptualising culture in conflict 
resolution’, Journal of Intercultural 
Studies, 30(2):121–40. 
Clastres, P., 2007. Society Against the State: 
essays in political anthropology, Zone 
Books, New York.
Fraenkel, J., 2004. ‘The coming anarchy 
in Oceania? A critique of the 
“Africanisation of the South Pacific” 
thesis’, Commonwealth & Comparative 
Politics, 42(1):1–34.
Fukuyama, F., 2008. ‘State building in 
the Solomon Islands’, Pacific Economic 
Bulletin, 23(3):1–17.
Geertz, C., 1979. ‘From the native’s point of 
view: on the nature of anthropological 
understanding’, in P. Rabinow and 
W.M. Sullivan (eds), Interpretive Social 
Science: a reader, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, Calif.:225–41.
Harrison, S., 2007. Fracturing Resemblances: 
identity and mimetic conflict in Melanesia 
and the West, Berghahn Books, New 
York and Oxford.
Hindess, B., 2001. ‘The liberal government 
of unfreedom’, Alternatives: Global, 
Local, Political, 26:93–111.
McDougall, D., 2000. ‘Paths of Pinauzu: 
captivity and social reproduction on 
Ranongga, Solomon Islands’, Journal of 
the Polynesian Society, (109):99–113.
——, 2005. ‘The unintended consequences 
of clarification: development, 
disputing, and the dynamics of 
community in Ranongga, Solomon 
Islands’, Ethnohistory, 52(1):81–109.
McDougall, D. and Kere, J., forthcoming. 
‘Christianity, custom, and law: conflict 
and peacemaking in the post-conflict 
Solomon Islands’, in M. Brigg and 
R. Bleiker (eds), Mediating Across 
Difference: Asian and Oceanic approaches 
to conflict resolution, University of 
Hawai’i Press, Honolulu.
Martin, K., 2007. ‘Your own buai you 
must buy: the ideology of possessive 
individualism in Papua New Guinea’, 
Anthropological Forum, 17(3):285–98. 
Scott, M.W., 2000. ‘Ignorance is cosmos; 
knowledge is chaos: articulating a 
cosmological polarity in the Solomon 
Islands’, Social Analysis, (44):56–83.
Sillitoe, P., 1998. An Introduction to the 
Anthropology of Melanesia: culture and 
tradition, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge and New York.
Sykes, K., 2007. ‘Interrogating individuals: 
the theory of possessive individualism 
161
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 24 number 3 october 2009 © the australian national university
in the Western Pacific’, Anthropological 
Forum, 17(3):213–24. 
White, G.M. and Watson-Gegeo, K., 1990. 
‘Disentangling discourse’, in G.M. 
White and K. Watson-Gegeo (eds), 
Disentangling: conflict discourse in Pacific 
societies, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, Calif.:3–49.
Zimmer-Tamakoshi, L., 1997. ‘Last 
big man: development and men’s 
discontents in the Papua New Guinea 
Highlands’, Oceania, 68(2):107–22.
Acknowledgments
I particularly want to thank Duran Angiki, 
Jodie Curth and Debra McDougall for 
helpful comments and suggestions on an 
earlier draft. Thanks also to Manuhuia 
Barcham, Wren Chadwick, Rebecca Duffy, 
Nicole George and Oliver Richmond. I take 
full responsibility for the text.
View publication stats
